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1. Introduction
Pension deficits (i.e., defined benefit liabilities) represent one of the most important
issues facing Japanese firms today. Only a small percentage of Japanese firms listed on
Japanese stock exchanges have defined benefit plans that are either adequately funded or
overfunded. Pension deficits are calculated as the difference between defined benefit
obligations and plan assets, and are recognized on the balance sheet. Actuarial assumptions
are important factors in estimating an entity’s defined benefit obligations and defined benefit
cost. The assumptions include discount rates, expected rates of return on plan assets, rates of
future salary increases, mortality, rates of employee turnover, and other elements. The
changes in these assumptions can have either a negative or positive effect on the amounts of
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defined benefit obligations and defined benefit cost. Several prior research studies show that
managers change their actuarial assumptions to reduce these amounts when they manage
their earnings.
There are several requirements when an entity determines actuarial assumptions, and
these requirements are different for each accounting standard. Currently, Japan is making
progress toward convergence with, and adoption of, International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRSs). Given this transitional stage, it is important to recognize the differences
in setting actuarial assumptions between Japanese accounting standards for retirement
benefits and International Accounting Standard No.19: Employee Benefits (IAS19). Among
other actuarial assumptions, there are several different requirements for the determination of
discount rates between Japanese accounting standards and IAS19.
In Japan, accounting standards for retirement benefits require an entity to determine the
discount rate-based yields on safe and secure long bonds, including both corporate and
government bonds, whereas IAS19 requires an entity to refer to market yields on high
quality corporate bonds (HQCB). If there is no deep market for these bonds, the entity has
to use market yields on government bonds. There are three other important differences in
setting actuarial assumptions between Japanese accounting standards for retirement benefits
and IAS19: a revision of the discount rate, the treatment of yield curve, and the calculation
of interest cost on plan assets. All of these items are related to discount rates. Therefore, the
focus of this paper is the requirements of discount rates.
Okumura (2005) states that if an entity’s discount rate is increased one percentage point
from 3% to 4%, and certain reasonable actuarial conditions are assumed, the amount of
defined benefit obligations will drop 23%. The change in discount rates would have a
significant effect on both an entity’s financial condition and operating results. Therefore, this
paper first refers to several prior researches on the determination of discount rates and
discusses the effect of changing discount rates on an entity’s financial statements. Second,
the paper explains the differences in setting discount rates between Japanese accounting
standards for retirement benefits and IAS19. Finally, we compare financial data from fiscal
2009 (when Japanese accounting standards required an entity to review the discount rate
annually) through fiscal 2013 (the latest year for which data are available) for Japanese
firms listed on Japanese stock exchanges adopting IFRSs versus those adopting Japanese
accounting standards; we then consider the impact of the accounting change to IFRSs.
2. The Effect of Changing Discount Rates on Financial Statements
The discount rate has an important role in estimating the present value of defined benefit
obligations and, as a result, the funding status of a firm’s defined benefit plan. Patel and
Daykin (2010) mention that in practice there is a reasonable range of discount rates for
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firms to choose from different data sources, including HQCB whose interest rates can be
used as a basis for determining the yield curve for the discount rate. If a firm sets the
discount rate at a level that does not rationally reflect market conditions, it will conceal the
actual amount of Projected Benefit Obligations (PBO)  as well as mislead employees
about the amounts they have available for retirement1. If the discount rate is too volatile, it
will cause wildly fluctuating current values and lead to firms and trustees being unable to
make decisions. An inappropriate discount rate can result in poor decision-making in
transactions2.
Blankley et al. (2010) recognize the material impact of a discount rate change on the
financial statements, and indicate that firms should choose discount rates corresponding to a
benchmark consisting of the rates on a portfolio of HQCB. Firms change their discount
rates in a manner that reduces the volatility in corporate bond rates. Blankley and Tang
(1995) test if there is a relationship between a firm’s discount rate change and the funding
ratio. The test indicates that firms which decrease their discount rates tend to lower their
funding ratios more often than those which increase their rates. On the other hand, firms
which increase their discount rates tend to raise their funding ratios more often than those
which decrease their rates. However, nearly half of those firms which decrease their
discount rates increase their funding ratio. They conclude that the discount rate change can
explain a portion of the funding reduction, and a firm’s improved economic condition can
also affect the firm’s funding status.
Newell et al. (2002) examine the relationship between a firm’s discount rate and the
funding status of defined benefit plans. Their results show that firms which have overfunded
their defined benefit plans assume higher discount rates than those that have underfunded.
Setting higher discount rate assumptions results in better funding status. Butt (2012) also
mentions that almost all of the variance in funding ratio movements can be explained by the
movement in actuarial assumptions, including the discount rate and pension increases, as
well as the difference between investment returns and the discount rate.
Blankly et al. (2004) estimate the likely effect of discount rate changes on future pension
expense, earnings, and cash flows. They develop a two-period model for pension expense
and its associated earnings impact. They indicate that firms’ defined benefit costs tend to
increase significantly when they lower their discount rates in response to past and current
economic conditions. The decline in the discount rate also has a negative effect on cash
flows: all firms would face additional funding requirements in order to prevent funding
ratios from deteriorating. These researches indicate the effect of a firm’s discount rate
1 Guay, R. and L. A. Jean (2013), p.13.
2 Cowling, C. A., R. Frankland, R. T. G. Hails, M. H. D. Kemp, R. L. Loseby, J. B. Orr and A. D. Smith
(2012), p.156.
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change on the financial statements. The discount rate change affects the amounts of PBO,
defined benefit liability, and defined benefit cost, and the effect is significant on all.
The discount rate can be determined at a firm’s discretion. Some researches indicate that
corporate managers might change their discount rates for earnings management.
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995) examine which factors affect the choice of discount rate.
They find that a firm’s leverage and degree of pension funding can have important roles in
the choice. Asthana (1999) also finds that a firm’s pension funding status affects the choice
of discount rate. The study reports that firms with overfunded status tend to choose
conservative actuarial choices to maximize tax benefits. On the other hand, firms with
underfunded status make liberal actuarial choices to minimize contributions. The study also
indicates that a firm’s profitability, cash flow from operations, tax liability, and debt have an
effect on the choice of discount rate. Obinata (2000) examines which criterion firms refer to
use when they determine their discount rates and concludes that firms choose their discount
rates in consideration of the rate of return on equity. Ghicas (1990) employs a logit model
to investigate a firm’s determination of a change in method for defined benefit cost
allocation. This change leads to a decrease in defined benefit cost and in the funding status
of the defined benefit plans. The paper finds that firms use higher actuarial assumptions
including discount rates when their pension funding becomes worse.
Godwin et al. (1996) examine whether six factors including changes in cash flows,
earnings per share, leverage, dividends, tax status, and market interest rate motivate
managers to change their actuarial assumptions. They conclude that managers are likely to
increase their actuarial assumptions to deal with declines in earnings, tighter dividend
restrictions, and higher leverage. Parker (2009) studies whether or not managers manipulate
defined benefit cost to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. He employs the estimated cross-
sectional regression model, and examines the relationship between the change in defined
benefit cost and the capital-market-based incentive measure to manipulate earnings. The
incentive of earnings management is calculated as the difference between pre-tax earnings
absent pension manipulation and analysts’ earnings forecasts. He concludes that managers
have strong incentives for earnings management to achieve analysts’ earnings forecasts in
order to support their stock price and avoid lower valuations.
Lew (2009) investigates whether financially distressed firms use the pension actuarial
assumptions for earnings management. He analyzes 588 firms over the period of 1988-2002
using the three-stage-least-square method. To explain the relationship between firms’
financial condition and their discount rate changes, the equation includes changes in
earnings per share, debt to equity ratio, cash flows, funding ratio, and so on as exogenous
variables. The analysis shows that a change in discount rate is related to defined benefit
cost; therefore, firms use discount rates to manipulate their defined benefit costs.
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There are some rules firms have to follow to determine their discount rates. Several
studies show that the determination of a firm’s discount rate can be affected by several
financial factors, such as the firm’s profitability, leverage, or pension funding status. Also, if
Japanese firms change to adoption of IFRSs, the rules for setting discount rates would be
different. The change in discount rate has a significant effect on a firm’s financial
statements. Therefore, it is important to understand the rules for setting discount rates under
Japanese accounting standards and IFRSs to see if the firm sets the discount rate
appropriately, and the effect of the change to IFRSs should also be considered.
3. Setting Rules for Discount Rate on Retirement Benefits
3.1 Reference Yield
ASBJ Statement No.26: Accounting Standard for Retirement Benefits (ASBJ Statement
26) states that an entity shall determine the discount rate based on yields on safe and secure
long bonds. These include government bonds, government agency securities, and high-grade
corporate bonds (ASBJ Statement 26, par.20). High-grade corporate bonds are bonds with
an AA rating or better, assigned by several credit-rating agencies (ASBJ Guidance 25,
par.24).
On the other hand, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) requires an
entity to use the discount rate as determined by market yields on HQCB at the end of the
reporting period; if there is no deep market for these bonds, the entity has to use the market
yields on government bonds (IAS19, par.83). The discount rate reflects the time value of
money, the currency, and the estimated remaining period of benefit payments. It does not
reflect the actuarial or investment risk, the entity-specific credit risk borne by the entity’s
creditors, and the risk that future experience may differ from actuarial assumptions (IAS19,
pars.84, 85).
The IFRS Interpretations Committee discussed a request for guidance on the
determination of the discount rate for post-employment benefit obligations in February,
March, May, July and November 2013. The issues on which guidance was requested were
as follows:3
(a) according to paragraph 83 of IAS19, the discount rate should be determined by
reference to market yields at the end of the reporting period on HQCB;
(b) IAS19 does not specify which corporate bonds qualify to be HQCB;
(c) according to prevailing practice, listed corporate bonds have usually been
considered to be HQCB if they receive one of the two highest ratings given by
a recognized rating agency (e.g., “AAA” and “AA”); and
3 IFRS Interpretations Committee (2013a), p.1.
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(d) because of the financial crisis, the number of corporate bonds rated “AAA” or
“AA” has decreased in proportions that the submitter of the request considers
significant.
Agenda Reference No.7: IAS19 Employee Benefits -Discount Rate (Agenda Reference 7)
mentions that the Interpretations Committee proposed to delete paragraph 83  which
requires an entity to determine the discount rate by reference to market yields at the end of
the reporting period on HQCB, and yields on government bonds are to be used if there is
no deep market for HQCB  and modify paragraph 84 as follows to address these issues in
the IFRS Interpretations Committee meeting in May 2013 (Agenda Reference 7, par.9):
84 One actuarial assumption that has a material effect is the discount rate. The
objective of the discount rate is to reflect only the time value of money and at
most very low credit risk, the currency and the estimated term of the post-
employment benefit obligations. The discount rate does not reflect but not the
actuarial or investment risk of the plan assets (as defined in paragraph 28).
Furthermore the discount rate does not reflect the entity-specific credit risk
borne by the entity’s creditors, and nor does it reflect the risk that future
experience may differ from actuarial assumptions.
The Interpretations Committee suggested clarifying the following factors to adopt
amended paragraph 84: time value of money, very low credit risk, currency, and maturity
(Agenda Reference 7, par.11). The Interpretations Committee also discussed whether the
government bonds should be of high quality, and how to meet the objective if there is no
deep market in HQCB or high quality government bonds (Agenda Reference 7, par.14). It
concluded that staff proposals on these issues were too broad an amendment to IAS19.
Therefore, the Interpretations Committee suggested that staff consider whether “high
quality” is a relative or an absolute concept4.
In the subsequent meeting in July 2013, the Interpretations Committee discussed whether
the term “high quality” used in paragraph 83 of IAS19 is a relative or an absolute concept.
Agenda Reference No.11: IAS19 Employee Benefits −Discount Rate (Agenda Reference 11)
notes that the term “high quality” in paragraph 83 is an absolute concept in common
understanding, because it does not require an entity to use corporate bonds with the highest
quality (Agenda Reference 11, par.11)5. If HQCB is an absolute concept, the Interpretations
Committee recommends establishing the reference point for HQCB in Implementation
Guidance (because rating agencies can change their rating scales over time) (Agenda
Reference 11, par.21). If the relative concept is introduced for HQCB, it is necessary to
amend paragraph 83 (Agenda Reference 11, par.14).
4 International Accounting Standards Board (2013), par.10.
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If the absolute concept is adopted for HQCB, it is suggested clarifying which credit
ratings should be used to determine an entity’s discount rate (Agenda Reference 11, par.20).
Under current practice, corporate bonds rated higher than AA are considered HQCB. The
idea is largely based on an Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Announcement from
1993 based on the premise of capital markets in the U.S.; other capital markets might have
different characteristics6. In addition, a number of corporate bonds were downgraded in the
aftermath of the financial crisis  e.g., the volume of corporate bonds rated AA
significantly declined7. Therefore, it is not reasonable to consider corporate bonds with
ratings higher than AA to determine discount rates in other jurisdictions with capital markets
of different characteristics. On the other hand, if the relative concept is adopted for HQCB,
it is necessary to set out requirements for an entity on how it should select the population of
bonds to use to determine the discount rate (Agenda Reference 11, par.25). The Interpretations
Committee decided to stop this project, because it could not reach a consensus on a timely
basis on how the entity should choose the population of HQCB, or when it can use lower
quality bonds to determine the discount rate (Agenda Reference 11, par.29).
Through these frequent discussions, the Interpretations Committee decided not to add
these issues to its agenda, because it would be difficult to issue additional guidance on, or
change the requirements for, the determination of the discount rate in an efficient manner8.
However, it would be useful to consider these issues stated by staff to estimate more
5 The Interpretations Committee explains the terms of a relative and an absolute concept of HQCB as
follows (Agenda Reference 11, pars.7, 8):
A relative concept of high quality means that:
(a) The notion of high quality is defined by reference to the highest quality corporate bonds
issued in the same currency of the liability;
(b) The notion of high quality should not be linked to a fixed credit rating, such as “AA”; and
(c) The reference point for high quality will change as the population changes. Consequently,
the population of bonds used as the reference for determining the highest quality bond will
need to be defined based on a characteristic other than credit quality. In other words, the
number of HQCB, or the market depth of HQCB, used to determine the discount rate
should be stable over time.
An absolute concept of high quality means that:
(a) The reference point for high quality should be consistent over time and independent of the
number of bonds, or the depth of the market in such bonds;
(b) It should be linked to a fixed credit rating, for example the two highest ratings given by an
internationally recognized rating agency;
(c) Changes in the depths of the HQCB market should not change the reference point for high
quality. It should remain, for example, equivalent to “AA” from period to period. In the
absence of a deep market in HQCB, the entity should revert to a government bond rate; and
(d) The number of HQCB used to determine the discount rate may change over time.
6 Financial Accounting Standards Board (2012), par.S99-1.
7 Accounting Standards Committee of Germany (2012), pp.1-2.
8 Ibid., p.12.
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appropriate discount rates for Japanese entities.
As indicated, ASBJ Statement 26 requires an entity to refer to market yields on both
government and corporate bonds. On the other hand, IAS19 requires an entity to refer to
market yields on corporate bonds. If there is no deep market for these bonds, the entity has
to refer to market yields on government bonds. It is assumed that market yields on corporate
bonds are higher than those on government bonds, because they generally have a higher
default risk. If Japanese firms place a heavy emphasis on yields on corporate bonds to
determine their discount rates, the adoption of IFRSs will not have a significant effect on
firms’ financial statements. However, if they determine their discount rates based on
government bonds rather than corporate bonds, the accounting change might increase their
discount rates and, as a result, decrease the amount of their defined benefit obligations.
3.2 Yield Curve
The Japanese Society of Certified Pension Actuaries (JSCPA) and The Institute of
Actuaries of Japan (IAJ) revised Standards for Mathematical Practice on Accounting
Standards for Retirement Benefits (Standards for Mathematical Practice) and Guidance for
Mathematical Practice on Accounting Standards for Retirement Benefits (Guidance for
Mathematical Practice) in 2014 for the purpose of providing reliable information for
financial statement users (Standards for Mathematical Practice, par.1).
Under the Guidance for Mathematical Practice, a yield curve is defined as a curve
representing several yields on discount bonds with different length of period, which are
called spot rates. Discount bonds are bonds which have no interest payment during the
period and redeemed only on maturity. To estimate the yield curve, an entity sets a universe
of market data on corporate and government bonds and uses a well-known model such as
Nelson-Siegel or Svenson. When an entity sets a universe of market data, it has to consider
bond type, bond grading, treatment for structured bonds, data reliability, elimination of
abnormal value and outlier, and appropriate revision of the universe of market data
(Guidance for Mathematical Practice, par.3.2.1). Table 1 shows the movement of spot rate
yield curves for Japanese corporate and government bonds rated “AAA” or “AA” by
Moody’s.
As mentioned above, market yields on corporate bonds are higher than on those on
government bonds owing to a higher default risk. To estimate a yield curve based on
corporate and government bonds, the following factors should be considered:9
(a) many bonds are traded on a negotiated basis, and not all trading results are
disclosed;
9 The Japanese Society of Certified Pension Actuaries (2011), p.13.
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(b) some bonds are not traded actively;
(c) when bonds are not traded actively or market turbulence occurs, it is difficult
for firms to estimate tradable bond prices based only on bid/ask information;
(d) corporate bonds with long maturities in the marketplace are far fewer than
government bonds; a yield curve calculated based on corporate bonds has to be
estimated with interpolated data; and
(e) when a rating agency delays changing firms’ ratings, some bonds which should
be excluded might be in a universe of bonds used to calculate a yield curve.
The figure of a yield curve (flat or steep) and the stability (whether the change in the
figure of the yield curve over time is significant) affect the determination of a discount
rate10.
ASBJ Guidance No.25: Guidance on Accounting Standard for Retirement Benefits (ASBJ
Guidance 25) states that “discount rates have to reflect the estimated remaining period of
10 Ibid, p.14.
Table 1. The Movement of Spot Rate Yield Curves for
Japanese Corporate and Government Bonds
Note: Corporate bonds are those rated “AAA” or “AA” by Moody’s. Coupon-bearing bonds
refer to the average value listed on the statistical chart of over-the-counter government
and corporate bonds at the end of March, 2014.
Source: JP Actuary Consulting Co., Ltd. (2014).
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each retirement benefit payment.” To calculate the defined benefit obligations, an entity can
use (1) a single weighted average discount rate calculated with consideration of the
estimated remaining period and the amounts of each retirement benefit payment, or (2)
multiple discount rates based on the estimated remaining period of each benefit payment
(ASBJ Guidance 25, par.24).
Guidance for Mathematical Practice states that it is important to understand yield curves
when an entity determines the discount rate in accordance with the ASBJ Guidance 25
(Guidance for Mathematical Practice, par.3.2).
There are four approaches for determining discount rates (Guidance for Mathematical
Practice, par.3.2.2):
(a) Yield curve direct approach
A number of discount rates are used, which are calculated based on spot rates
with different estimated payment periods according to employees’ retirement
dates.
(b) Yield curve equivalence approach
A single weighted average discount rate is used, which leads to the same
amount of defined benefit obligations calculated under the yield curve direct
approach.
(c) Duration approach
A single weighted average discount rate is used, which is a spot rate with a
time-period equivalent to the duration of defined benefit obligations.
(d) Weighted average period approach
A single weighted average discount rate is used, which is a spot rate with a
weighted average period based on the amount of defined benefit obligations
that has occurred by the end of the period.
Table 2 shows the difference between approaches (a) and (b). Approach (a), the yield
curve direct approach, sets multiple discount rates depending on the estimated benefit
payment period. For example, if the discount rate for the estimated defined benefit
obligations is i% for T-year maturity, the present value is calculated by the following
formula:
Present Value = Estimated Defined Benefit Obligations with T-year Maturity × (1/(1+i/100))T
Therefore, if the discount rate for estimated defined benefit obligations with a 2-year
maturity is 0.2%, the present value is the estimated defined benefit obligations multiplied by
(1/1.002)2. Under approach (b), which adopts a single weighted average discount rate, the
amount of defined benefit obligations is estimated based on approach (a), and a single
discount rate which results in the same amount of defined benefit obligations under
approach (a) is calculated.
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Approaches (c) and (d) also adopt a single weighted average discount rate, which is a
spot rate with a time-period equal to the duration of defined benefit obligations. The
duration indicates an average benefit payment period.
Approaches (a) and (b) have theoretical consistency. Approach (d) can be considered a
Table 2. Yield Curve Direct Approach and Yield Curve Equivalence Approach
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specific case of approach (c), because it sets a single discount rate as 0% and calculates the
duration (Guidance for Mathematical Practice, par.3.2.2).
Approaches (b), (c), and (d) have a potential drawback in that they do not adequately
reflect the configuration of a yield curve, because they adopt a single weighted average
discount rate. However, they are more practical, because (1) an entity can use a matrix
representation when it determines whether the discount rate should be revised with
consideration of the principle of changes in discount rates, and (2) it is easier to calculate
the interest cost on defined benefit obligations.
On the other hand, approach (a) has clarity, as it applies the estimated remaining period
of each benefit payment to the discount rate11. If an entity adopts approach (a), the interest
cost can be smaller than when adopting other approaches, because defined benefit
obligations with shorter estimated remaining periods of benefit payments have lower
discount rates and are of greater size. There is also the possibility that the amount of
defined benefit obligations calculated with a discount rate under approaches (c) and (d) will
be significantly different from that under approaches (a) and (b), because approaches (c) and
(d) refer to a single point on a yield curve corresponding to the duration or weighted
average period12. Therefore, choosing one of these approaches affects the amount of defined
benefit obligations and interest cost for the period.
Until fiscal 2012, JICPA Accounting Practice Committee Report No.13: Practical
Guidance on Accounting for Retirement Benefits (JICPA Report 13) allowed an entity to
determine the discount rate based on the average remaining service period of employees
(JICPA Report 13, par.1.11)13. In practice, firms generally used the average remaining
service period of employees to calculate their defined benefit obligations. The Report also
stated that data on bond yields at the end of the reporting period were based on yields on
long-term government bonds, or a matrix representation of rated bonds provided by the
Japan Securities Dealers Association (JICPA Report 13, par.1.59).
However, there were two problems in using discount rates on an average remaining
service period based on the matrix representation:14
(a) Most bonds in the marketplace are interest-bearing bonds, not discount bonds;
and
(b) The number of samples of 10-years-plus maturity bonds is far fewer than of up
11 Mikami, T. (2013).
12 Shibata, S. (2013), p.3.
13 However, as mentioned above, the report required an entity to set the discount rate which reflects the
estimated average remaining period of each retirement benefit payment in principle (JICPA Report 13,
par.1.11).
14 Hotta, A. (2011), p.2.
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-to-10-year maturity bonds. There is great variability in these observable data.
The Report was superseded in accordance with the revision of Accounting Standard for
Retirement Benefits, ASBJ Statement 26 in 2012. The new accounting standard that requires
firms to adopt discount rates with consideration of the estimated timing of benefit payments
is adopted for annual periods beginning on or after April 1, 2014.
On the other hand, IAS19 states that “the discount rate reflects the estimated timing of
benefit payments. In practice, an entity often achieves this by applying a single weighted
average discount rate that reflects the estimated timing and amount of benefit payments and
the currency in which the benefits are to be paid (IAS19, par.85).” The JSCPA interviewed
nine firms in England, five firms in Germany, three firms in Netherland, and two firms in
Switzerland which adopt IFRSs, and it reported the following five methods were adopted by
these firms to set their discount rates:15
(a) Yield curve direct approach;
(b) Yield curve equivalence approach;
(c) Yield duration approach;
(d) Index approach; and
(e) Sample cash-flow approach.
Approaches (a), (b), and (c) are the same as approaches (a), (b), and (c) under Guidance
for Mathematical Practice in Japan, respectively. Approach (d) sets a discount rate based on
average trading values on HQCB or yield value on bond indexes with consideration of
average estimated period of benefit payments on defined benefit plans. It does not use a
yield curve. Approach (e) sets a discount rate based on sample cash flows with different
features, including durations under a number of defined benefit plans. Adopting approach
(b) for sample cash-flows, a single weighted average discount rate is calculated, which leads
to the equivalent amount of defined benefit obligations. Countries which adopt the sample
cash-flow approach have some similarities in that most defined benefit plans are lifetime
annuities, and a firm’s benefit formula is straight-line. On the other hand, Japanese firms
provide retirement lump sum grants and pension plans to their employees. Employees can
decide whether to receive their pension benefits as lump-sum withdrawal payments. Their
benefit formulas have different curve lines depending on the defined benefit plan, and are
significantly affected by rates of employee turnover. Under these conditions, it is difficult
for Japanese firms to adopt the sample cash-flow approach16.
There is no significant difference in setting a yield curve between Japanese standards and
IAS19. The yield curve can move up and down depending on which bonds an entity
15 The Japanese Society of Certified Pension Actuaries (2011), pp.3, 26-28.
16 Ibid., pp.26, 27.
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chooses to emphasize in determining the discount rate. Therefore, reference yields indicated
in Section 3.1 affect the entirety of the yield curve.
3.3 The Principle of Changes in Discount Rate
There is an approach for determining whether the discount rate should be revised called
the principle of changes in discount rate. ASBJ Guidance 25 states the discount rate is
required to be revised when the defined benefit obligations as measured using a discount
rate at the end of the year are compared to those at the end of the previous year, and this
amount exceeds 10% of the previous year’s obligations (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.30).
On the other hand, IAS19 does not adopt the principle of changes in discount rate. It
requires an entity to determine the discount rate in reference to market yields at the end of
the reporting period on HQCB (IAS19, par.83). Therefore, the rate is reviewed annually, and
the change in the rate is reflected in the amount of defined benefit obligations.
Both ASBJ Statement 26 and current IAS19 are applied to annual periods from fiscal
2013 (IAS19, par.172, ASBJ Statement 26, par.34)17. These accounting standards create a
significant change in the disclosure of unrecognized obligations, including unrecognized past
service cost and unrecognized actuarial gains or losses. When an entity changes the discount
rate, the effect of the discount rate change on PBO is recognized as actuarial gains and
losses (ASBJ Statement 26, par.11). IAS19 requires an entity to recognize actuarial gains
and losses in other comprehensive income immediately, and they are not reclassified to
profit or loss in a subsequent period (IAS19, par.122). ASBJ Statement 26 requires an entity
to recognize actuarial gains and losses in profit or loss. The entity is allowed to recognize
the cost over several years. The length of the period should be less than the employees’
average remaining service period. The cost that is not recognized for the period is included
as unrecognized actuarial gains or losses in other comprehensive income (ASBJ Statement
26, par.24).
Under IAS19, when there is a change in discount rates, actuarial gains and losses in net
assets are recognized immediately. In contrast, under ASBJ Guidance 25, an entity considers
whether the discount rate should be revised with the principle of changes in discount rate.
17 ASBJ Statement 26 made following major changes from the previous requirements:
(a) Treatment of actuarial gains and losses and past service costs;
(b) Determination of retirement benefit obligations and current service costs;
(c) Enhanced disclosures;
(d) Amendment to the treatment of multi-employer plans; and
(e) Clarification of the concept of long-term expected rate of return.
All amendments except for the items (b) are applied from the end of annual periods beginning on or
after April 1, 2013. The requirement for discount rates included in items (b) is applied from the end of
annual periods beginning on or after April 1, 2014.
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Therefore, if an entity decides not to change the discount rate, it has an undisclosed risk in
the amount of defined benefit liability. Thus, when the amount of defined benefit obligations
as measured using a discount rate at the end of the year exceeds 10% of the previous year’s
obligations, an entity shall include a significant amount of unrecognized actuarial gains or
losses in net assets18.
3.4 Interest Income on Plan Assets and Expected Return on Plan Assets
The expected return on plan assets is defined as an expected return resulting from the
management of plan assets (ASBJ Statement 26, par.10). The return is calculated by
multiplying the plan assets at the beginning of the period by the expected rate of return on
plan assets (ASBJ Statement 26, par.23). The expected rate of return on plan assets is
determined with consideration of the plan asset portfolio, management performance in the
past, management policy, and the market situation during the period of time when the plan
assets are allocated for the payment of employee benefits (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.25). The
difference between the actual rates and the expected rates of return on plan assets is
recognized as actuarial gains and losses which is a part of defined benefit cost in profit or
loss (ASBJ Statement 26, par.11). When the actuarial gains and losses are recognized in
profit or loss, the cost can be spread over the average remaining service lives of employees
(ASBJ Statement 26, par.24).
With regard to IAS19, the expected return on plan assets is eliminated in current IAS19,
because the IASB found it difficult to determine the return in an objective way, and the
possibility existed that the return would include a return that occurred not simply from the
passage of time (IAS19, par.BC78). Currently IASB requires an entity to recognize interest
income on plan assets in the net interest on the net defined benefit liability (IAS19,
par.124)19. The interest income on plan assets is calculated by multiplying the fair value of
plan assets at the beginning of the period by the discount rate, which is determined by
reference to market yields at the end of the reporting period on HQCB (IAS19, pars.83,
125). The discount rate is used to determine both interest cost on the defined benefit
obligations and the return on plan assets. The difference between the interest income on
plan assets and the return on plan assets is recognized in the remeasurement of the net
defined benefit liability (assets) (IAS19, par.125).
Japanese firms tend to set their expected rates of return on plan assets higher than their
18 Teikoku Databank, Ltd. (2013).
19 The net interest on the net defined benefit liability (asset) consists of interest income on plan assets,
interest cost on the defined benefit obligation, and interest on the effect of the asset ceiling (IAS19,
par.124).
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discount rates20. If they use the discount rate to calculate the return on plan assets due to the
accounting change to IFRSs, they will increase the amount of the defined benefit cost.
4. The Effect of the Differences in Setting Discount Rates Between Japanese
Accounting Standards for Retirement Benefits and IAS 19
As explained in Section 3, there are several differences between setting discount rates
under Japanese accounting standards for retirement benefits and under IAS19. These
differences would have a significant effect on the amount of defined benefit obligations and
defined benefit cost when firms change their accounting standards to IFRSs. In this section,
financial data for Japanese listed firms adopting IFRSs and those adopting Japanese
accounting standards are compared to consider the effect of the accounting change to IFRSs.
4.1 Reference Yield and Yield Curve
As mentioned in Section 3.1, Japanese accounting standards for retirement benefits
require an entity to reference yields on both government and corporate bonds. IAS19 states
that an entity should determine the discount rate based on market yields on HQCB. It is
assumed that entities adopting IFRSs would use higher discount rates, because corporate
bonds generally have a higher default risk than government bonds.
Table 3 shows discount rates adopted by Japanese listed firms, yields on government
bonds in March, and yields on corporate bonds at the end of March from fiscal year 2009 to
2013. Firms that are treated in this research (excluding banks and insurance firms) adopt
Japanese accounting standards. They are listed on Japanese stock exchanges within the 12-
month fiscal years ending in March from fiscal 2009, when firms are required to review
their discount rates annually, through the latest year (fiscal 2013) for which data are
available21. Firms were selected that set both discount rates and expected rates of return on
plan assets for accounting standards for retirement benefits, and disclose plan assets on
financial statements. Financial data used in this study were collected from Nikkei Economic
Electronic Databank System (2014) which is provided by the Nikkei Digital Media, Inc.
Table 3 shows the range of discount rates firms adopting Japanese accounting standards
20 Kasaoka, E. (2014), pp.65, 71.
21 Until fiscal year 2008, the discount rate could be determined with consideration of the movement in
bond yields over a preceding time-period, less than five years in each firm (Accounting Standard for
Retirement Benefits, par.footnote6). With the ongoing convergence project with IASB, Japanese
accounting standards eliminated the rule and required firms to review their discount rates annually,
because ASBJ Statement No.19: Amendments to Accounting Standard for Retirement Benefits (Part 3)
(ASBJ Statement 19) states there is no adequate reason that can explain why this discount rate is more
reliable than the one calculated by a market yield at the balance sheet date (ASBJ Statement 19, par.
Appendix11).
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Table 3. Range of Discount Rates Firms Adopting Japanese Accounting Standards Use
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Under 1.0% 2 3 11 137 148
1.0% to 1.99% 293 307 511 837 870
2.0% to 2.99% 973 951 693 234 175
3.0% to 3.99% 1 1 − 3 −
4.0% to 4.99% − 1 2 − 3
5.0% to 5.99% 1 1 1 − −
6.0% to 6.99% 1 − − 1 1
Over 7.0% − − − − −
No. of Firms 1,271 1,264 1,218 1,212 1,197
Mean 1.989 1.966 1.824 1.412 1.366
Standard Deviation 0.341 0.331 0.389 0.453 0.455
Yields to Subscribers on Government Bonds (%)
with 10-year Maturity 1.329 1.310 0.973 0.636 0.597
with 20-year Maturity 2.159 2.130 1.795 1.623 1.527
with 30-year Maturity 2.301 2.184 1.964 1.820 1.635
Average Yields on HQCB (%)
with 10-year Maturity 1.626 1.853 1.246 0.852 0.857
with 15-year Maturity 2.039 1.993 1.768 1.369 1.274
with More-Than- 20-year Maturity 2.446 2.488 2.038 1.679 1.882
Notes: The data of average yields on HQCB is weighted average of the information provided by
Rating and Investment Information, Inc., Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., Standard and
Poor’s, and Moody’s until December 2009, by Rating and Investment Information, Inc., Japan
Credit Rating Agency, Ltd., and Standard and Poor’s until June 2011, and Rating and
Investment Information, Inc. and Japan Credit Rating Agency from July 2011, which is
calculated by IIC Partners Co., LTD.
Source: Nikkei Economic Databank System (2014)
IIC Partners Co., LTD. “Corporate Bond Yields,” http://www.pmas-iicp.jp/Portals/ 0/pdf/
databank /bond/syasai_full.pdf
Ministry of Finance. “Bidding Information,” http://www.mof.go.jp/jgbs/auction/index.html
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use. Yields to subscribers of government bonds rather than distribution yields are shown in
the table, because firms generally refer to these yields. About 150 to 200 firms disclose
several or a range of discount rates on defined benefit plans in both Japan and other
countries. Japanese defined benefit plans tend to use lower discount rates than other
countries’ plans because of the low interest rates on government and corporate bonds in
Japan. Therefore, when firms disclose several or the range of discount rates, the lowest rate
is shown in the table. Table 3 indicates that most firms adopt less-than-3% discount rates.
The average discount rate in each year is similar to the yield of 20-year government bonds
or of 15-year HQCB. Firms tend to refer to these yields to set their discount rates.
Japanese firms are allowed to adopt IFRSs from the end of annual periods ending after
March 31, 2010. There were 28 Japanese firms that adopted IFRSs in fiscal 201322. Table 4
shows the 28 firms, their number of employees, average age of employees, average salary,
and average length of service23.
The table shows that firms in the pharmaceutical and wholesale trade industries strove to
adopt the standards. Firms in pharmaceutical industry can gain advantages in adopting
IFRSs owing to the high proportion of overseas sales in total sales. Those in wholesale trade
industry are all general trade companies (sogo shosha) that have extended their business
operations around the world. Adopting IFRSs increases the comparability of their financial
statements for foreign investors and improves a firm’s management systems, including those
of their foreign subsidiaries24.
Firms in the electric appliance industry, and in securities and commodity futures, on a
consolidated basis have fewer employees than those in other industries. The average age of
employees and average length of service for firms in services, securities and commodity
futures, and communication and information industries, are shorter than those in other
industries. These firms might have fewer defined benefit obligations and plan assets than
those in other industries. On the other hand, firms in the wholesale trade industry tend to
have more than 50,000 employees on a consolidated basis and provide higher salaries to
their employees than those in other industries. Their average length of service ranges from
15 to 20 years. Therefore, it is assumed that these firms would have a large amount of
defined benefit obligations and plan assets, and the effect of discount rate changes on its
obligations would be significant.
Table 5 represents discount rates of Japanese firms adopting IFRSs. The weighted
average duration indicates the average benefit payment period to employees. Four firms out
22 There are 16, 2 and 3 firms which will adopt IFRSs after fiscal year 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively.
23 Average age of employees, average salary, and average length of service are the data of parent
companies.
24 Yoshino, Y. (2014), p.3.
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Table 4. Japanese Firms Adopting IFRSs
Firm Industry Group
Fiscal Year for
the First
Adoption of IFRS
No. of
Employees
Average
Age of
Employees
Average Salary
(thousand yen)
Average
Length of
Service (years)
Nihon Dempa Kogyo Co., Ltd. Electric Appliances March, 2010 971(3,713) 39.2 5,191 13.5
HOYA Corporation Precision Instruments March, 2011 3,128(36,605) 42.4 7,380 17.1
Sumitomo Corporation Wholesale Trade March, 2011 5,228(74,638) 42.7 13,048 18.3
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. Glass & CeramicsProducts March, 2012
2,053
(27,079) 42.2 7,268 18.8
Japan Tobbaco Inc. Foods March, 2012 8,774(51,563) 43.8 8,944 22.2
DeNA Co., Ltd. Services March, 2013 1,045(2,197) 32.1 7,186 3.1
Anritsu Corporation Electric Appliances March, 2013 757(3,880) 41.0 7,833 17.2
SBI Holdings Inc. Securities & CommodityFutures March, 2013
172
(5,352) 37.8 7,256 7.1
Monex Group Inc. Securities & CommodityFutures March, 2013
30
(992) 38.3 9,255 5.0
Sojitz Corporation Wholesale Trade March, 2013 2,229(15,915) 42.2 10,520 15.3
Marubeni Corporation Wholesale Trade March, 2013 4,289(39,465) 41.7 12,745 16.8
Tosei Corporation Real Estate November, 2013 120(227) 36.8 6,908 5.6
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Pharmaceutical December, 2013 4,936(6,872) 41.2 9,276 15.6
Rakuten Inc. Services December, 2013 3,762(10,867) 32.5 6,522 3.8
NEXON Co., Ltd. Information &Communication December, 2013
266
(4,661) 32.4 4,998 3.3
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. Glass & CeramicsProducts December, 2013
6,269
(51,448) 40.7 8,024 16.7
SoftBank Corp. Information &Communication March, 2014
185
(70,336) 38.9 11,464 6.7
Astellas Pharma Inc. Pharmaceutical March, 2014 5,777(17,649) 41.7 10,359 16.6
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Pharmaceutical March, 2014 6,578(31,225) 38.8 9,435 14.1
Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Pharmaceutical March, 2014 2,608(2,858) 40.1 8,732 15.9
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. Pharmaceutical March, 2014 5,744(32,791) 42.3 10,363 17.7
Sosei Group Corporation Pharmaceutical March, 2014 12(30) 41.1 8,070 4.9
Ricoh Co., Ltd. Electric Appliances March, 2014 9,041(108,195) 42.1 7,991 17.5
Itochu Corporation Wholesale Trade March, 2014 4,235(102,376) 41.3 13,836 16.1
Itochu Enex Co., Ltd. Wholesale Trade March, 2014 493(3,954) 41.1 8,830 14.9
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Wholesale Trade March, 2014 6,160(48,090) 42.4 13,515 19.1
Mitsubishi Corporation Wholesale Trade March, 2014 6,358(68,383) 42.8 13,552 18.7
Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. Retail Trade August, 2014 1,088(30,488) 36.5 7,359 5.2
Notes: The number of brackets indicates number of employees on a consolidated basis.
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Table 5. Range of Discount Rates Firms with IFRSs Adopt
Firm
Fiscal Year for the
First Adoption of
IFRS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Weighted
Average
Duration
(Domestic)
in FY2013
Nihon Dempa Kogyo Co., Ltd. March, 2010 1.7 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.0 12.0
HOYA Corporation March, 2011 1.5 1.6 1.5 4.4 4.5
Sumitomo Corporation March, 2011 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.4 1.8 18.0
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. March, 2012 2.0-5.8(2.0)
1.9-5.6
(2.0)
1.7-4.7
(1.7)
1.4-4.2
(1.4)
1.4-4.2
(1.4) 13.0
Japan Tobbaco Inc. March, 2012 2.5-5.8(2.5)
1.7-5.4
(1.7)
1.4-5.5
(1.4)
1.0-4.4
(1.0)
0.9-3.9
(0.9) 7.6
DeNA Co., Ltd. March, 2013 Defined Contribution Plan
Anritsu Corporation March, 2013 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.1 1.1
SBI Holdings Inc. March, 2013 Multi-Employer Plan, Simple Approach
MonexGroup Inc. March, 2013 Defined Contribution Plan
Sojitz Corporation March, 2013 2.0-2.3 1.4-2.3 2.2 2.7 2.6 10.8
Marubeni Corporation March, 2013 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.2 1.3 14.6
Tosei Corporation November, 2013 Multi-Employer Plan, Simple Approach
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. December, 2013 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 1.5 14.5
Rakuten Inc. December, 2013 No Pension Plan
NEXON Co., Ltd. December, 2013 Defined Contribution Plan
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. December, 2013 2.5 2.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 17.0
SoftBank Corp. March, 2014 1.8 1.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 10.0
Astellas Pharma Inc. March, 2014 2.0-5.2 2.0-5.4 2.0-5.7 0.8-4.8(0.8-1.0)
0.8-4.5
(0.8-1.0) 12.8
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. March, 2014 1.3-2.0 1.3-2.0 1.0-3.9 1.1-3.2(1.1)
1.1-3.2
(1.1) 12.7
Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. March, 2014 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 17.3
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. March, 2014 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.8 15.5
Sosei Group Corporation March, 2014 Multi-Employer Plan, Simple Approach
Ricoh Co., Ltd. March, 2014 2.1-6.2(2.1)
2.0-5.6
(2.0)
1.6-4.7
(1.6)
1.3-4.4
(1.3)
1.0-4.4
(1.0) 14.0
Itochu Corporation March, 2014 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.4 12.0
Itochu Enex Co., Ltd March, 2014 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.7-1.6 1.0-1.3 11.0
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. March, 2014 2.5 2.5 2.1 1.3 1.4 16.0
Mitsubishi Corporation March, 2014 2.7 2.7 2.6 1.8 1.9
Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. August, 2014 Defined Contribution Plan
Notes: Numbers shown in parentheses are discount rates for domestic defined benefit plans.
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
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of 28 have defined contribution plans. The number of firms having only defined
contribution plans has been increasing recently because of the volatility and risks that
defined benefit plans have. HOYA Corporation increased their discount rate from fiscal
2012. This firm mainly has defined contribution plans for employees, and only provides
defined benefit plans where it is required to by local law or regulations. However, it had
defined benefit plans for domestic subsidiaries owing to its merger with PENTAX
Corporation in 2008. The plans were implemented by fiscal 2012, and defined benefit plans
are adopted mainly for foreign subsidiaries.
Comparing Table 5 with Tables 6 and 7, most firms adopt discount rates based on yields
on 10- to 20-year government and corporate bonds before the adoption of IFRSs, and did
not significantly change their discount rates after the adoption of the standards. This result
stems from the fact that yields on HQCB are only 0.1%-0.5% higher than those on
government bonds25.
Some firms adopt higher discount rates than yields on government bonds. Sumitomo
Table 6. Yields to Subscribers on Government Bonds
(%)
Term to Maturity (Years)
Year Month 5 10 20 30
2009 12 0.465 1.246 2.105 2.208
3 0.485 1.329 2.159 2.301
2010 11 0.339 0.968 1.902 1.976
12 0.565 1.189 2.073 2.185
3 0.597 1.310 2.130 2.184
2011 11 0.329 1.025 1.703 1.938
12 0.357 1.085 1.749 1.963
3 0.293 0.973 1.795 1.964
2012 11 0.189 0.777 1.681 1.934
12 0.163 0.730 1.737 1.931
3 0.120 0.636 1.623 1.820
2013 11 0.193 0.605 1.514 1.616
12 0.197 0.648 1.586 1.704
2014 3 0.204 0.597 1.527 1.635
Source: Ministry of Finance. “Bidding Information,” http://www.
mof.go.jp/jgbs/auction/index.html
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Corporation, Marubeni Corporation, Mitsui & Co., Ltd., and Mitsubishi Corporation adopted
U.S. GAAP before they adopted IFRSs. Accounting Standards Codification 715
Compensation − Retirement Benefits requires firms to set their discount rates based on
available information on rates implicit in current prices of annuity contracts, including
available annuity rates published by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
(par.715-30-35-43)26. This requirement is similar to IAS19.
Sojitz Corporation and Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. increased their discount rates after
Table 7. Average Yields on HQCB
(%)
Term to Maturity (Years)
Year Month 5-6 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 18-19 19-20 over 20
2009 12 0.759 1.575 1.587 1.767 1.828 1.936 1.984 2.157 2.235 2.259 2.241 2.443
3 0.804 1.626 1.709 1.820 1.883 1.995 2.039 2.129 2.273 2.243 2.306 2.446
2010 11 0.658 1.335 1.494 1.565 1.688 1.870 1.873 1.980 2.040 2.030 2.108 2.219
12 0.614 1.246 1.379 1.458 1.566 1.781 1.758 1.883 1.966 1.973 2.047 2.147
3 0.982 1.853 1.605 1.694 1.801 2.033 1.993 2.139 2.502 2.455 2.451 2.488
2011 11 0.796 1.298 1.436 1.521 1.929 1.778 1.817 1.916 1.976 2.008 2.039 2.081
12 0.757 1.244 1.401 1.472 1.978 1.683 1.729 1.887 1.927 1.962 1.937 2.016
3 0.707 1.246 1.395 1.529 1.968 1.626 1.768 1.830 1.909 1.990 1.898 2.038
2012 11 0.643 1.042 1.141 1.518 1.395 1.463 1.646 1.782 1.789 1.818 1.825 1.986
12 0.667 1.168 1.232 1.625 1.455 1.515 1.801 1.816 1.863 1.866 1.904 2.038
3 0.468 0.852 0.979 1.283 1.044 1.139 1.369 1.390 1.501 1.461 1.552 1.670
2013 11 0.410 0.807 1.084 0.955 1.051 1.160 1.298 1.402 1.464 1.535 1.642 1.790
12 0.492 0.928 1.217 1.068 1.140 1.302 1.365 1.491 1.537 1.636 1.705 1.881
2014 3 0.417 0.857 1.112 0.976 1.050 1.216 1.274 1.409 1.416 1.537 1.608 1.882
Source: IIC Partners Co., LTD. “CorporateBond Yields,” http://www.pmas-iicp.jp/Portals/ 0/pdf/ databank/bond/syasai_full.pdf
25 In the U.S., based on the data provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the difference between
the 10-, 20-, and 30-year treasury nominal coupon-issue yield curve and the 10-, 20-, and 30-year
treasury high quality market corporate bond yield curve ranges from 1.5% to 3.0%. The high quality
market corporate bonds include bonds with better than A grades. The U.S. Department of the Treasury.
“Economic Policy,” http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Pages/default.aspx.
26 The interest rates that the PBGC issued to determine the present value of annuities in March from 2010
to 2014 are as follows:
Years 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1-20 4.89 4.07 3.74 2.67 3.35
>20 4.63 3.93 3.70 3.01 3.50
Source: Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. “ERISA 4044 (Immediate and Deferred) Annuities,”
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/interest/ida.html
Eriko KASAOKA66
they adopted IFRSs. Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. and Mitsubishi Corporation use higher
discount rates than average yields on more than 20-year HQCB. Most firms have not
changed their discount rates because of the adoption of IFRSs in Japan. However, it is
important to understand that there are several firms that might choose higher discount rates
after they have adopted the standards, because firms have to determine their discount rates
based on yields on HQCB.
4.2 The Principle of Changes in Discount Rate
IAS19 requires firms to review their discount rates annually. Table 5 shows that firms
adopting IFRSs tend to change their discount rates every fiscal year according to the
movement of stock and bond prices in their plan assets. Table 8 represents how often and
how much Japanese listed firms adopting Japanese accounting standards change their
discount rates.
The table shows that about 75% to 85% of firms did not change their discount rates,
except in fiscal 2011-2012. Japanese accounting standards on retirement benefits also
require firms to review their discount rates annually; however, as noted in Section 3.3, firms
are allowed to leave their discount rates as is when the change in discount rates would not
have a significant effect on the amount of PBO in the previous year. Most firms changing
their discount rates decrease their rates due to difficult economic conditions in Japan.
Japanese stock prices have been increasing since 2013. Therefore, the number of firms
increasing their discount rates rises in fiscal year 2013.
Table 9 shows the changes in the amount of actuarial gains and losses depending on
whether firms change or do not change their discount rates. Actuarial gains and losses are
caused by the following under Japanese accounting standards on retirement benefits (ASBJ
Statement 26, par.11):
(a) A difference between the actual return on plan assets during a period and the
expected return on plan assets for that period;
(b) A difference between the actual rate in calculating defined benefit obligations
during a period and the estimated rate for that period; and
(c) A modification of estimated rates.
It is important to understand that actuarial gains and losses do not solely represent the
amount of changes in discount rates. However, the table displays a tendency that, when
firms decrease their discount rates, they have a higher amount of actuarial gains and losses
than that in the previous year. On the other hand, when firms increase their discount rates,
they have fewer actuarial gains and losses than in the previous year.
Firms with no change in discount rates also show a decrease in the amount of actuarial
gains and losses from the previous year  except for fiscal 2009-2010 when the amount
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increases. Table 10 shows the plan asset structure of firms with Employees’ Pension Fund
and Defined-Benefit Corporate Pensions, which are Japanese corporate defined benefit plans.
Firms tend to allocate 40% to 50% of invested funds to domestic bonds and stocks, and
25% to 30% to foreign bonds and stocks. It is assumed that the return and amount of plan
assets reflect a significant impact from Japanese and overseas economic circumstances.
Table 11 shows the rates of return on plan assets. Compared with the number of changes in
actuarial gains and losses in Table 9, when firms manage their plan assets efficiently  i.e.,
firms enjoy some return from the management of plan assets  firms with no change in
discount rates show a decrease in actuarial gains and losses. In 2009-2010, when firms had
losses on their plan assets, their actuarial gains and losses increased.
Table 8. Frequency and Level of Change in Discount Rates
2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013
Firms Decreasing DR
x < -1.0% 4 8 76 7
-1.0 x < -0.5% 24 128 373 53
-0.5 x < -0.1% 60 189 216 72
-0.1 x < 0% 43 21 11 33
131 346 676 165
Firms With No Change
0% 1,069 821 506 896
Firms Increasing DR
0% < x  0.1% 13 6 2 41
0.1% < x  0.5% 8 8 4 55
0.5% < x  1.0% 4 3 1 12
x > 1.0% 3 5 1 22
28 22 8 130
Total 1,228 1,189 1,190 1,191
Mean -0.03 -0.14 -0.41 -0.02
Min. 1.10 2.20 1.50 2.20
Max. -1.52 -2.05 -2.10 -1.90
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.33 0.44 0.31
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
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Table 9. Changes in Actuarial Gains and Losses, and Ratios Related to PBO
Changes in Changes in
AGL* AGL/PBO** PBO/LIAB PA/PBO AGL/PBO
2009-2010 Decreasing DR 0.484 0.457 0.244 0.562 0.146
No Change 0.091 0.094 0.254 0.574 0.122
Increasing DR -0.089 -0.088 0.236 0.614 0.097
2010-2011 Decreasing DR 0.816 0.673 0.262 0.567 0.153
No Change -0.270 -0.275 0.245 0.600 0.107
Increasing DR -0.054 -0.009 0.195 0.509 0.126
2011-2012 Decreasing DR 1.289 1.065 0.268 0.611 0.116
No Change -0.989 -0.990 0.253 0.648 0.069
Increasing DR -2.769 -2.875 0.224 0.628 0.043
2012-2013 Decreasing DR 0.378 0.303 0.238 0.625 0.056
No Change -1.105 -1.111 0.250 0.692 0.045
Increasing DR -0.310 -0.339 0.222 0.659 0.060
AGL = ActuarialGains and Losses, PBO = Projected Benefit Obligations, LIAB = Total Liabilities,
PA = Plan Assets
*Changes in AGL = (AGLt - AGLt-1) / AGLt-1
**Changes in AGL / PBO =



AGLt
PBOt
AGLt-1
PBOt-1



-1
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
Table 10. Plan Asset Structure
(%)
Domestic
Bonds
Domestic
Stocks
Foreign
Bonds
Foreign
Stocks
General
Account
Assets
Short-Term
Fund Others
2009 26.99 20.34 13.31 13.30 12.59 4.44 9.03
2010 26.11 21.33 12.17 16.65 4.69 4.19 3.16
2011 26.84 18.89 11.49 17.53 12.97 3.70 8.58
2012 27.16 17.43 12.04 16.33 14.00 4.22 8.81
2013 27.89 14.48 13.30 16.27 13.69 4.54 9.83
Source : Pension Fund Association. “The Survey and Comment on Pension Asset Management,”
http://www.pfa.or.jp/activity/tokei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html
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Actuarial gains and losses to PBO and PBO to liability ratios show that firms increasing
their discount rates have lower ratios than those decreasing their rates. When firms increase
their discount rates, they can lower actuarial gains and losses and PBO. Therefore, these
firms have higher ratios on plan assets to PBO, and lower ratios on actuarial gains and
losses to PBO. The plan assets to PBO ratio represents a firm’s pension funding status.
Therefore, firms that increase their discount rates are better funded than those decreasing
their rates.
As noted above, actuarial gains and losses do not represent only the changes in discount
rates. They also include a difference between the actual rates and the estimated rates to
calculate defined benefit obligations and plan assets. IAS19 requires firms to disclose a
sensitivity analysis for each significant actuarial assumption as of the end of the period.
Firms have to show how the PBO would have affected changes in the actuarial assumption
that were reasonably possible at that date (IAS19, par.145(a)). Japanese firms adopting
IFRSs disclose a sensitivity analysis; the sensitivity analysis of each firm assumes that other
variables remain fixed27. Table 12 shows the details of the sensitivity analysis for various
firms.
Table 12 reveals that when firms increase their discount rates by 0.5%, firms show, on
average, about a 6% decline in their PBO. On the other hand, when firms decrease their
discount rates by 0.5%, they have an increase of 6.5% in PBO. Table 8 shows that when
firms change their discount rates, they tend to decrease the rates by 0.1% to 1.0%. Firms
would experience a significant effect from the changes in discount rates on their PBO, and
as a result of their pension funding status (overfunded or underfunded) if they adopt IFRSs.
Table 11. Rates of Return on Plan Assets
(%)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Rates of Return on Plan Assets 14.29 -0.54 1.82 11.17 8.80
Source: Pension Fund Association. “The Survey and Comment on Pension Asset Management,”
http:// www.pfa.or.jp/activity/tokei/shisanunyo/jittai/index.html
27 However, actuarial assumptions do not always change independently; they might be affected by the
changes in other actuarial assumptions.
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Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis of Japanese Firms Adopting IFRSs
Firm Discount RateChange (%) PBO (million yen)
Defined Benefit
Liability (million
yen)
The Effect of
Changes in
Discount Rate on
PBO (million yen)
The Effect of
Changes in
Discount Rate on
PBO in foreign
subsidiaries
(million yen)
Nihon Dempa Kogyo Co., Ltd. 0.1 8,823 4,013 105
0.1 106
HOYA Corporation 4,832 1,675
Sumitomo Corporation 0.5 311,343 5,840 17,916
0.5 21,800
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. 0.5 368,924 90,425 -5.2% -6.2%
0.5 5.7% 6.9%
Japan Tobbaco Inc. 0.5 789,809 323,933 11,555 32,618
0.5 12,394 36,585
Anritsu Corporation 1.0 31,047 2,088 3,787
1.0 4,691
Sojitz Corporation 0.5 21,708 16,768 894
0.5 1,005
Marubeni Corporation 0.5 292,351 68,701 11,463
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 0.25 68,436 -2,593 2,507
0.25 2,560
Asahi Glass Company Limited 0.5 378,235 86,505 26,793
0.5 30,716
SoftBank Corp. 0.5 267,681 77,041 672 18,320
0.5 712 20,790
Astellas Pharma Inc. 0.5 178,003 27,184 12,560
0.5 14,026
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 0.5 309,312 76,497 12,917 5,461
0.5 14,171 6,168
Ono Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 0.5 43,838 3,945 3,496
0.5 3,984
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. 1.0 140,784 8,947 18,227
1.0 22,413
Ricoh Co., Ltd. 0.5 515,211 124,508 33,053
0.5 36,438
Itochu Corporation 1.0 331,110 46,685 23,739
Itochu Enex Co., Ltd 0.25 7,780 7,042 122
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 0.5 350,467 69,509 21,822
0.5 24,625
Mitsubishi Corporation 0.5 539,546 10,032 28,456
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4.3 Interest Income on Plan Assets and Expected Return on Plan Assets
Discount rates are determined based on yields on safe and secure long bonds. As shown
in Section 4.1, Japanese listed firms adopting Japanese accounting standards tend to choose
discount rates that are similar to the yield of 20-year government bonds or of 15-year
HQCB. On the other hand, the expected rates of return on plan assets can be selected based
on the firm’s plan assets portfolio, past management performance, management policy, and
so on (ASBJ Guidance 25, par.25). Therefore, the range of expected rates of return Japanese
firms select might be wider than that for discount rates, and the average expected rates of
return would be set higher than the average discount rates28. Table 13 shows the difference
Table 13. Difference between Expected Rates of Return on Plan Assets and
Discount Rates
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ERR < DR
x < -5.0% 1 2 0 0 0
-5.0  x < -1.0% 168 146 116 69 77
-1.0  x < 0% 283 283 277 223 225
452 431 393 292 302
No Difference Between ERR and DR
0% 351 354 310 170 174
ERR > DR
0% < x  1.0% 323 334 377 464 429
1.0% < x  5.0% 125 117 132 262 277
x > 5.0% 1 2 2 2 5
449 453 511 728 711
Total 1,252 1,238 1,214 1,190 1,187
Mean -0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.42 0.44
Min. -6.21 -5.32 -4.80 -3.03 -4.20
Max. 5.10 5.90 7.20 6.90 5.94
Standard Deviation 1.02 0.98 0.96 0.94 1.03
ERR =Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets, DR = Discount Rate
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
28 Kasaoka, E. (2014), pp.65, 71.
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between expected rates of return on plan assets and the discount rates Japanese listed firms
adopting Japanese accounting standards use.
These firms tend to select expected rates of return on plan assets that are higher than
discount rates. Before fiscal 2012, IAS19 required firms to adopt expected rates of return on
plan assets to calculate return on plan assets, currently, firms have to determine their interest
income on plan assets using discount rates. Adopting expected rates of return on plan assets
that are higher than discount rates indicates that firms would have a negative impact from
the adoption of IFRSs on their financial statements. Following the recent increases in stock
prices, in the past two years, the number of firms adopting expected rates of return on plan
assets that are more than 1% higher than discount rates is twice as many as those before
fiscal 2011.
The expected return on plan assets is calculated by multiplying the plan assets at the
beginning of the period by the expected rate of return on plan assets (ASBJ Statement 26,
par.23). When firms adopt IFRSs, they have to use discount rates to calculate their return on
plan assets, which under IAS19 is defined as interest income on plan assets. Firms that use
expected rates of return on plan assets that are higher than discount rates under Japanese
accounting standards would have a negative impact from the accounting standard change on
their income statement. In turn, firms that adopt expected rates of return on plan assets that
are below discount rates would have a positive impact. Table 14 shows the effects of the
Table 14. Impact on Defined Benefit Cost from the Difference between Expected Return on
Plan Assets and Interest Income on Plan Assets, and on Income before Taxes
for Firms Adopting Japanese Accounting Standards for Retirement Benefits
(%)
Difference Between ERR
and DR * PA / DBC
Difference Between ERR
and DR * PA / NIBT
2009 ERR < DR 4.11 4.09
ERR > DR -5.28 -6.61
2010 ERR < DR 5.26 3.98
ERR > DR -7.41 -3.88
2011 ERR < DR 4.94 2.42
ERR > DR -4.99 -5.14
2012 ERR < DR 4.05 1.37
ERR > DR -6.73 -8.44
2013 ERR < DR 6.15 1.36
ERR > DR -9.46 -2.69
ERR = Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets, DR = Discount Rate,
PA = Plan Assets, DBC = Defined Benefit Cost,
NIBT = Net Income Before Taxes
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
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adoption of discount rates on defined benefit cost and net income before taxes.
Firms adopting expected rates of return on plan assets that are higher than discount rates
would show negative effects on defined benefit cost by 4.99% to 9.46%, and on net income
before taxes by 2.69% to 8.44%. Firms adopting expected rates of return on plan assets that
are below discount rates would show positive effects on defined benefit cost by 4.05% to
6.15%, and on net income before taxes by 1.36% to 4.09%. The transition to IFRSs would
cause a significant impact on firms’ income statements.
Since fiscal 2013, firms adopting IFRSs have adopted discount rates to calculate their
interest income on plan assets. In fiscal 2012, these firms used expected rates of return on
plan assets for the calculation of expected return on plan assets. In their financial statements
for fiscal 2013, they show the amount of interest income calculated using discount rates in
the previous fiscal year, fiscal 2012. Comparing these amounts, the effect of the assumptions
change from expected rates of return to discount rates on plan assets can be seen. Table 15
displays discount rates and expected rates of return on plan assets firms adopted in fiscal
2012, and expected return on plan assets disclosed in financial statements for the same year.
It also shows interest income, which is a return on plan assets calculated by multiplying
Table 15. Expected Return on Plan Assets and Interest Income on Plan Assets of
Firms Adopting IFRSs in Fiscal 2012
Firm DR (%) ERR (%)
Plan Assets at the
beginning of the
period (million yen)
Expected Return on
Plan Assets
(million yen)
Interest Income
(million yen)
Nihon Dempa Kogyo Co., Ltd. 1.5 1.9 4,304 69 69
HOYA Corporation 4.4 6.5 2,442 205 176
Sumitomo Corporation 1.4 2.1 295,201 5,525 5,525
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. 1.4-4.2 0.0-8.3 261,177 10,695 9,553
Japan Tobbaco Inc. 1.0-3.7 - 372,425 11,120 11,041
Anritsu Corporation 1.1 2.5 27,190 490 398
Sojitz Corporation 2.7 3.9 4,673 156 156
Marubeni Corporation 2.2 2.7 214,941 6,044 4,968
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 2.3 0.8-2.5 66,267 1,387 1,114
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. 1.7 2.8 236,652 5,707 5,125
SoftBank Corp. 1.0
Astellas Pharma Inc. 0.9-4.8 2.5-5.0 137,530 3,439 3,168
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 1.0-3.2 1.5-3.1 250,407 4,929 4,211
Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 1.4 1.0-1.4 40,901 522 771
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. 1.6 3.0 107,111 2,820 2,502
Ricoh Co., Ltd. 1.6-4.7 1.4-5.5 347,704 10,517 9,495
Itochu Corporation 1.7 2.8 271,842 7,277 4,440
Itochu Enex Co., Ltd 0.7-1.6 0.0-2.5 735 0 7
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. 2.1 3.3 259,243 7,755 5,060
Mitsubishi Corporation 2.6 2.5 483,938 8,058 11,210
DR = Discount Rate, ERR = Expected Rate of Return on Plan Assets
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (2014)
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plan assets by discount rates in fiscal 2012 (disclosed in financial statements in fiscal 2013).
Most firms show a decrease in the return on plan assets after adopting discount rates for
the calculation. Only three firms, Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Itochu Enex Co., Ltd., and
Mitsubishi Corporation, show an increase, because they set their discount rates higher than
their expected rates of return on plan assets.
Table 16 shows the impact on defined benefit cost from the difference between expected
return on plan assets and interest income on plan assets, as well as that for income before
taxes. Most firms show a negative effect on both defined benefit cost and on net income
before taxes. However, the impact on net income before taxes is insignificant due to the
high profitability in these firms in fiscal 2012. Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. has high ratios
Table 16. Impact on Defined Benefit Cost from the Difference between Expected Return on
Plan Assets and Interest Income on Plan Assets, and on Income before Taxes
for Firms Adopting IFRSs
(%)
Firm
The Difference between
Expected Rate of Return and
Interest Income / DBC
The Difference between
Expected Rate of Return and
Interest Income / NIBT
Nihon Dempa Kogyo Co., Ltd. 0.000 0.000
HOYA Corporation -1.803 -0.032
Sumitomo Corporation 0.000 0.000
Nippon Sheet Glass Co., Ltd. -85.929 -3.672
Japan Tobbaco Inc. -0.352 -0.016
Anritsu Corporation -11.084 -0.570
Sojitz Corporation 0.000 0.000
Marubeni Corporation -9.016 -0.684
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. -6.542 -0.376
Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. -2.838 -0.776
SoftBank Corp. - -
Astellas Pharma Inc. -1.763 -0.213
Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. -3.154 -0.540
Ono Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 11.679 0.755
Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. -2.227 -0.332
Ricoh Co., Ltd. -5.546 -1.501
Itochu Corporation -22.282 -0.747
Itochu Enex Co., Ltd 1.176 0.057
Mitsui & Co., Ltd. -14.506 -0.527
Mitsubishi Corporation 13.157 0.712
DBC = Defined Benefit Cost, NIBT = Net Income Before Taxes
Source: Nikkei Economic Electronic DatabankSystem(2014)
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on both defined benefit cost and net income before taxes, because it decided to freeze a
defined benefit plan for active employees from April 2013. It recognized a gain from this
freeze of ¥5,568 million on the income statement, and as a result, it recorded a small
amount of negative defined benefit cost for the fiscal year. Japanese listed firms adopting
Japanese accounting standards also would have a negative impact on their income statement
due to the change to IFRSs.
5. Summary and Conclusion
The Liberal Democratic Party, which is the dominant party in Japan, issued a set of
policy recommendations, “Japan Revival Vision” in May 2013. The recommendation
discusses accounting standards. It states that it is important for Japan to unify accounting
standards to a single set of standards that will be accepted internationally, and essential to
expand voluntary adoption of IFRSs among Japanese firms. The party aims to have more
than 300 firms adopt IFRSs by the end of 201629. Given these circumstances, it is assumed
that more firms will adopt IFRSs in the foreseeable future. Therefore it is important to
understand the differences between Japanese accounting standards and IFRSs to consider the
accounting change to IFRSs.
This paper focused on the discount rate for retirement benefits, which is an important
factor for calculating defined benefit obligations and defined benefit cost. Both Japanese
accounting standards for retirement benefits and IAS19 require firms to review their
discount rates annually. When firms change their discount rates, it will have a significant
effect on defined benefit obligations and defined benefit cost. As shown in Section 4.2,
when firms increased their discount rates by 0.5%, they could reduce about 6% of their
PBO on average. Pension deficits are one of the most important issues facing Japanese
firms. Several papers showed that managers used discount rates to have better pension
funding, or to manage their earnings.
There are four differences in setting discount rates on retirement benefits between
Japanese accounting standards for retirement benefits and IAS19: reference yield, yield
curve, the principle of changes in discount rate, and interest income on plan assets and
expected return on plan assets. With regard to reference yield and yield curve, it was
assumed that Japanese firms would adopt higher discount rates after the adoption of IFRSs,
because IAS19 requires firms to refer to HQCB in setting rates. However, most firms
adopting IFRSs did not change their discount rates significantly after adoption. This is
because yields on HQCB were not substantially different from those on government bonds.
There were several firms which increased their discount rates or used higher rates than
29 The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Japan Economic Revival Headquarter (2014), p.46.
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yields on 20-year HQCB after the adoption of IFRSs. The result indicates that there is a
possibility that firms would change their discount rates because of the accounting change.
As for the principle of changes in discount rate, if the effect of a firm’s discount rate
change does not have a significant effect on PBO in the previous year, the firm does not
have to revise the discount rate. That means that the firm has an undisclosed risk in the
amount of defined benefit liability. This paper showed that firms adopting IFRSs changed
their discount rates every year, whereas 75% to 85% of those adopting Japanese accounting
standards did not change their discount rates in each fiscal year. The change in discount rate
is recognized as a part of actuarial gains and losses, which account for 10% to 15% of
PBO. If firms adopt IFRSs, they would have higher volatility in PBO and defined benefit
liability. Most firms adopting Japanese accounting standards decreased their discount rates in
each fiscal year; therefore, they would incur a negative impact by adopting IFRSs.
The difference between interest income on plan assets and expected return on plan assets
has an effect on a firm’s income statement. Section 4.3 showed that firms tended to select
expected rates of return on plan assets that are higher than discount rates. Under IAS19,
expected return on plan assets was eliminated, and a discount rate is used to determine the
interest income on plan assets. Therefore, these firms would have a negative impact from
the accounting change. This paper shows that the difference between interest income on
plan assets and expected return on plan assets for Japanese firms adopting Japanese
accounting standards would lead to a decline of 5% to 10% of defined benefit cost.
As noted above, the discount rate has a significant impact on the calculation of defined
benefit obligations and defined benefit cost. This paper clarifies that most Japanese listed
firms adopting Japanese accounting standards would incur a negative effect on their
financial statements because of the adoption of IFRSs. Therefore, firms might consider
changing their pension plans from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, or
freeze their pension plans to reduce pension asset management risk.
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